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Abstract
The current climate of insecurity has in a sense presented an opportunity for those with restrictive immigration agendas to use a new vocabulary to advance long desired objectives as well as
new policies that sacrifice fairness and negatively affect immigrants. The result has been a decline
in due process and the undermining of basic protections of international refugee and human rights
law, including: the prohibition on arbitrary detention, embodied in Article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the prohibition on returning a refugee to persecution, the
cornerstone of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
and the right to asylum, contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The task that
Arthur Helton flagged–ensuring that the rights of refugees are not violated in the new “securitized”
climate–has become a monumental challenge.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, the world changed in many ways.
The tragic events of that day left many Americans with a greater
understanding of the sense of vulnerability that is a daily reality
for many of the world's refugees. Arthur Helton, who dedicated
his legal career to advancing the human rights of refugees, understood the impact that the attacks would have on those who
sought asylum in the United States. In June 2002, Helton observed that "[r] efugee and asylum policy is being securitized as a
result of the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11 ." Looking to the future, he stressed that "[t] he task will be to ensure
that these new security measures do not violate the rights of refugees."2
None of the September l1th hijackers were asylum-seekers
or refugees.' Yet those who seek refuge in the United States
have been profoundly affected by the many new immigration
policies and practices that were initiated in the months and years
following the attacks. Some asylum-seekers and refugees, like
other immigrants, were swept up in the series of immigration
enforcement actions that were launched by the U.S. government
* Director, Refugee Protection Program, Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights); J.D., Fordham University School of Law; B.A., Brown
University. The author would like to thank Sue Ann Brogan, Anwen Hughes, and
Ephrat Livni for their assistance in preparing this Article.
1. Arthur Helton, World Refugees: Arthur Helton, USAToDAY.COM, June 20, 2002, at
http://www.usatoday.com/community/chat/2002-06-20-helton.htm
(last visited Oct.
10, 2005).
2. Id.
3. See James H. Johnson, Jr., U.S. Immigration Reform, Homeland Security, and Global
Economic Competitiveness in the Aftermath of the September 11, 2001 TerroristAttacks, 27 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 419, 38 (2002) (discussing the immigration status of the September l1th hijackers).
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after September 11th. 4 At the same time, asylum-seekers have
also fallen victim to a broad shift away from individualized decision-making towards more blanket approaches - approaches
that have, for instance, called for the detention of asylum-seekers
based on their country of nationality rather than on an assessment of the need for detention in their individual cases. 5
Asylum itself has in some ways been redefined by the U.S.
government as a "security" issue. The refugee resettlement program was shut down for several months after September 11th,
even though none of the September 11th hijackers had entered
the country through that program.6 In a move that will permanently alter the asylum discourse in the United States, the responsibility for asylum matters, along with other immigration
functions, was transferred from the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS" or "the Department").7
It should hardly be a surprise then that some have tried to
adopt, and in some instances, exploit, the language of "security"
and the specter of "terrorism" to justify a wide range of changes
in U.S. law and policies. This language has been used by the
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") to justify regulatory measures that expedite asylum and other immigration appeals, as
well as policies that prohibit immigration judges from considering the need to detain individual Haitian asylum-seekers. s Ignor4. See infta notes 12, 23-38; see also Jody A. Benjamin, Iraqi Refugees Cleared by FBI
Could Still Face Deportation, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 12, 2001, at lB.
5. See infra note 96 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 105, 108-14 and
accompanying text.
6. See David A. Martin, A New Erafor U.S. Refugee Resettlement, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 299, 299-321

(2005); see also LAwYERs

COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (now

A YEAR OF Loss: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER
11 13 (2002), available at http://www.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/loss~report.pdf (last
visited Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter A YEAR OF Loss]; Elizabeth Heger Boyle & Fortunata
Ghati Songora, FormalLegality and East Afican Immigrant Perceptionsof the "War on Terror",
22 LAw & INEQ. 301, 320 (2004).
7. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security [DHS], Immigration and Borders, at http://
www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/themehome4.jsp (last visited Apr. 12, 2005); see also T. ALEXHUMAN RIGHTS FIRST),

ANDER ALEINIKOFF, CENTURY FOUNDATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S

FIRST YEAR 1 (2004), available at www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/aleinikoff immigration_0304.pdf (last visitedJune 7, 2005); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND THE NEW DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, INITIAL CONavailable at http://
PRELIMINARY
RECOMMENDATIONS
1
(2003),
CERNS
AND
www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/refs-032503.pdf (last visitedJune 7, 2005) [hereinafter REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND THE NEW DHS].
8. See infra notes 111, 114, 124 and accompanying text.
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ing significant past reforms and extensive security safeguards,
unsubstantiated claims that terrorists are trying to abuse the asylum system have been made in connection with efforts to push
legislation that would make it much harder for virtually all asylum-seekers to obtain asylum.9 One legislative proposal passed
by the House of Representatives was so extreme that it would
have barred U.S. federal courts from issuing stays of removal to
prevent asylum-seekers from being returned to their countries of
persecution while U.S. courts review their cases.' °
The current climate of insecurity has in a sense presented
an opportunity for those with restrictive immigration agendas to
use a new vocabulary to advance long desired objectives as well
as new policies that sacrifice fairness and negatively affect immigrants. The result has been a decline in due process and the
undermining of basic protections of international refugee and
human rights law, including: the prohibition on arbitrary detention, embodied in Article 9 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; the prohibition on returning a refugee
to persecution, the cornerstone of the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; and the right to
asylum, contained in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.1 1 The task that Arthur Helton flagged - ensuring that
the rights of refugees are not violated in the new "securitized"
climate - has become a monumental challenge.
I. THE INITIAL RESPONSE
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks,
the U.S. government launched a broad array of iniatives, including a series of immigration enforcement measures. 2 While a
9. See infra notes 154-56, 161, 169 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 147, 152, 167. As detailed later in this Article, this proposed
provision did not ultimately become law. See REAL ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418, 109th
Cong. (2005).
11. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 371; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee
Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
12. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND
11 UNITED STATES iv (2003), available at http://

SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER

www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNormal.pdf
(last visited May 13, 2005); MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMES-
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number of these changes impacted asylum-seekers, several had a
particularly significant effect on those who seek refuge in the
United States.
A.

The USA PatriotAct

On October 25, 2001, less than six weeks after the September 11th attacks, the U.S. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT
Act. 3 Signed into law the next day,1 4 the PATRIOT Act contains
a wide range of provisions that undermine civil rights and civil
liberties. For instance, the law greatly expanded the ability of
federal officials to carry out searches and seizures without prior
notice.' ' The PATRIOT Act also enhanced surveillance procedures, including eavesdropping on conversations between attorneys and clients.' 6
Among the many provisions included in the PATRIOT Act
are immigration provisions that further expanded the bars to admissibility and deportability relating to terrorism.' 7 For asylumseekers though, the new law triggered an increase in the use of
existing bars to asylum."8 Ironically, in the years since September l1th, the broad language of pre-September lth law has
11 (2003), available
at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Americas Challenges.pdf (last visited June
7, 2005); see also Tom Mccann, Lawyers Scramble to Help Immigrants Caught in the Net of
Tighter Enforcement, CHI. LAw., Aug., at 8 (2003) (discussing the impacts of post-September I Ith immigration law on asylum-seekers and other nonimmigrants).
13. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act), 18 U.S.C § 3103
(2005) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act]. The House of Representatives passed the PATRIOT Act on October 24, 2001, by a vote of 357 to 66, with 9 members not voting. See
147 Cong. Rec. H7224 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001) (roll call vote 398). The Senate followed suit the very next day, passing the act on October 25, 2001, by a vote of 98 to 1,
with 1 senator not voting. See 147 Cong. Rec. S11059-60 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (roll
call vote 313).
14. President Bush signed the PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001. See Scott Bernard Nelson, PatriotAct Would Make Watchdogs of Firms, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 2001, at
GI; A YEAR OF Loss, supra note 6 at 8.
15. See PATRIOT Act, 18 U.S.C § 3103 (2005).
16. See id.; see also John Whitehead, Forfeiting "EnduringFreedom"for "HomelandSecuriiy:" A ConstitutionalAnalysis Of The USA PATRIOT Act and theJustice Department'sAntiTerrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U.L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2002).
17. See PATRIOT Act, 18 U.S.C §§ 411-12 (2005); see also David Cole, Terrorizing
Immigrants in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 29 Hum. Rts. 11 (2002); Regina Germain,
Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA PATRIOT Act for Bona Fide
Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 517-25 (2002).
18. See Germain, supra note 17.
TIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER
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been used by U.S. immigration authorities to argue that a wide
range of people should be barred from asylum - including refugees who are actually victims of terrorism or repressive regimes. 19 This broadly sweeping approach is not consistent with
the Refugee Convention's precise approach in assessing whether
an individual refugee should be excluded from its protection.2 °
For example, attorneys working for DHS' Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") have argued that
members of a Burmese Christian ethnic minority, who are victims of torture and persecution at the hands of the notorious
Burmese military regime, are barred from asylum for having provided support to a political movement whose armed wing has
used force to oppose this repressive regime. 21 At the same time,
attorneys with the DOJ are now arguing that a former policeman
from Colombia - a victim of extortion by FARC guerillas who
controlled the territory where he lived - is barred from asylum
because the extorted payments somehow constituted "material
support" to FARC, a designated terrorist organization.2 2
B. Expansion of Detention Authority
In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the U.S. government took a number of steps to broaden its authority to detain
non-citizens. The PATRIOT Act gave U.S. immigration authorities unprecedented power to detain non-citizens who are designated as terrorist threats by the Attorney General. 2' The PA19. See, e.g., Germain, supra note 17, at 509, 512 (discussing how the ample preSeptember l1th provisions barring terrorists were used to prevent Colombian asylum
seekers, who were the victims of extortion, from entering the country); see also infra
note 22 and accompanying text.
20. See infta note 22 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the Refugee Convention's exclusion guidelines, see Michael Bliss, 'Serious Reasons For Considering': Minimum Standards of ProceduralFairnessin the Application of the Article 1F Exclusion
Clauses, 12 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 92 (2000, special supplementary issue).
21. Information about the position of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in these cases was received by Human Rights First through its pro bono representation and advocacy assistance.
22. See Brief for Human Rights First as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5,
Aria v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15999 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1999) available
(last visited
at http://humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/probono/special/pb-special.htm
Apr. 24, 2005) (explaining that petitioner's alleged voluntary payments to armed guerrillas were done out of fear of death).
23. For a discussion of the detention provisions of the USA Patriot Act, see
Germain, supra note 17; see also David Martin, The Missing PatriotDebate, NATION, May
30, 2005; Statement of David Martin to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
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TRIOT Act's immigration detention powers are however subject
24
to some degree of judicial review and Congressional oversight.
But even before the PATRIOT Act was passed, the DOJ had
begun taking steps to expand its already substantial authority to
detain non-citizens. On September 17, 2001, Attorney General
John Ashcroft issued a regulation increasing the number of
hours that the INS could detain someone without charge from
twenty-four to forty-eight hours. 25 The regulation also authorized detention without charge for an unspecified additional "reasonable period of time" in the event of an "emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance.

26

Unlike the PATRIOT Act's de-

tention provision, this authority is not limited to detainees sus27
pected of terrorist activity.
Another regulation, which took effect on October 29, 2001,
gave INS, and now DHS, attorneys - the prosecutors in immigration proceedings - the power, in effect, to suspend an immigration judge's release order. 21 Under the regulation, the government attorney's decision to appeal the judge's order triggers
an "automatic stay" of the judge's decision to release. 29 This rule
applies in the case of essentially any type of immigrant; there is
no requirement that the individual be suspected of a crime or
terrorist activity.3 ° This new power was used against some of the
many Arab and Muslim men detained in the United States in the
aftermath of the September 11th attacks, and before long, the
Upon the United States, (Dec. 8, 2003), at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/hearings/
hearing6/witnessmartin.htm (last visited June 7, 2005) [hereinafter David Martin
Statement] (recommending repeal of post 9-11 regulation expanding detention authority, citing its vague language and misuse).
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act [INA], § 236A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1226A
(2005); see also A YAR or Loss, supra note 6 at 17 (listing various safeguards, including
that the Attorney General must charge or release a detainee within seven days, that his
certification is subject to judicial review, and that he must report to Congress every six
months specific details about the use of these new powers).
25. See Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 66 Fed. Reg.
48,334, 48,335 (Sept. 17, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 287.3) (providing federal field
officers with expanded powers to detain aliens).
26. Id.
27. Compare id. with INA § 236A(b) (1), 8 U.S.C. 1226A (2005) (regarding detention of those the Attorney General certifies as suspected terrorists).
28. See Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909, 54,910 (Oct. 31,
2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19) (providing for an automatic stay of an immigration judge's decision to order an alien's release).
29. Id.
30. See id.
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INS began using this extraordinary power to prevent Haitian asylum-seekers from being released from detention in Florida."
C. The Detention of Arab and Muslim Men
In the wake of the September 11th attacks, over 1200 noncitizens - primarily Arab or Muslim men - were detained by the
U.S. government: 2 AJune 2003 report issued by the DOJ Office
of Inspector General ("GIG") documented a range of disturbing
abuses, including lengthy detentions without charges, denial of
access to counsel, and abusive treatment.3 While the vast majority of these individuals were not asylum-seekers, some refugees
were caught up in this wave of detentions.
The GIG report makes clear that many of those detained
after September l1th on immigration violations did not receive
core due process protections, and the decision to detain them
was at times "extremely attenuated" from the focus of the Sep31. See Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), WatchingJustice, available at http://www.watchingjustice.org/offices/oficeCompilation.php?docld=
33 (last visited Apr. 24, 2005) (noting immigration policies denying asylum to Haitians
and allowing indefinite detention of Haitians without consideration of individual circumstances); see also A YEAR OF Loss, supra note 6 at 19; Almonte-Vargas v. Elwood, 2002
U.S. Dist. Lexis 12387 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (lifting the automatic stay of an Immigration Judge's order to release a petitioner on bond); WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN, REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT: THE UNITED STATES AND DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC DENY HAITIANS PROTECTION 43 (2003), available at http://www.womenscommission.org/reports/index.shtml (last visited June 7, 2005).
32. According to the Department ofJustice's Office of Inspector General ("OIG"),
over 1200 non-citizens and citizens were detained within two months of the September
11 attacks. The Department of Justice advised DIG that it "stopped reporting the cumulative totals after the number reached approximately 1200, because the statistics became confusing." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

1

(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf (last visited June
7, 2005) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]; DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 25 (2003) (estimating that
by May 2003, more than 5,000 people had been forced into preventive detention); see
also Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 295,
331 (2002) (noting that within a matter of weeks after the attacks, approximately 1,000
people were detained).
33. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS,
June 2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htm (last visited
Apr. 24, 2005) [hereinafter TREATMENT OF ALIENS].
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tember 11th investigation. 4 The OIG found that the "vast majority" of the detainees were accused not of terrorism-related offenses, but of civil violations of federal immigration law. 5
With the new regulations expanding immigration detention
authority in place, many detainees did not receive notice of the
charges against them for weeks, and some for more than a
month after being arrested.16 The OIG reported that 192 detainees waited longer than seventy-two hours to be served with
charges; twenty-four were held between twenty-five and thirtyone days before being served; twenty-four were held more than
thirty-one days before being served; and five were held an average of 168 days before being served.
Also, the lack of timely
notice of the charges against them undermined the detainees'
ability to obtain legal representation, to request bond, and to
understand why they were being detained.3"
D. The Drop in Refugee Resettlement
Immediately after the September 11 th attacks, the Bush Administration ordered a suspension in the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, the U.S. humanitarian program which brings refugees from around the world to safety in the United States. 9
Through the program, faith-based and other resettlement
groups work with the U.S. government to welcome refugees into
the American community in a unique private-public partnership.
The program, held up as a model for other countries, has provided a new life in safety and dignity for hundreds of thousands
34. See id. ch. 4, § VII; OIG REPORT, supra note 32, at 69; see also ASSESSING THE NEW
supra note 12, at 34-35.
35. See TREATMENT OF ALIENS, supra note 33, ch. 3, Introduction; OIG REPORT,
supra note 32, at 27; see also ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL, supra note 12, at 34.
36. See TREATMENT OF ALIENS, supra note 33, ch. 3 § IV, at 30, 35; ASSESSING THE
NEW NORMAL, supra note 12, at 34-35; see also David Martin Statement, supra note 23.
37. See TREATMENT OF ALIENS, supra note 33, ch. 3, § III(A), at 30.
38. See id. ch. 3, § IV, at 155; see also ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL, supra note 12, at
35.
39. See Office of Refugee Resettlement, Administration for Children and Families,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, U.S. Resettlement Program - An Overview
(2002), at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/overviewrp.htm (last visited May 14, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. Resettlement Program] (explaining that three federal agencies play key roles in the Refugee Resettlement Program: DHS, The Department of State, and the Department of Health and Human Services); see also ASSESSING
THE NEW NORMAL, supra note 12, at 44-45; DAVID A. MARTIN, THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM: REFORMS FOR A NEW ERA OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (2005).
NORMAL,
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of refugees over the last two decades. 40
The resettlement suspension lasted for more than two
months while the Administration conducted a security review. 4 '
Even after resettlement resumed, though, the pace of resettlement was so slow that thousands of refugees each year were left
stranded in difficult and dangerous conditions. 42 This humanitarian effort fell from helping an average of 90,000 refugees resettled annually, to 27,110 in 20024' and 28,455 in 2003. 44
Nearly two years after September 11th, the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program was still hampered by lengthy delays in the
conduct of new security checks and, as a bipartisan group of
members of Congress noted, "a seeming chronic inability to
meet the refugee
admissions targets set in recent presidential de45
terminations.
The pace of resettlement improved substantially in 2004,
with a total of 52,868 refugees resettled during the fiscal year.4 6
Despite this progress though, the number of refugees resettled
40. See U.S. Resettlement Program, supra note 39.
41. See FRED TsAu, ILLINOIS COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT

AND REFUGEE RIGHTS, THE

Loss OF FREEDOM, EQUALITY, AND OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICA'S IMMIGRANTS SINCE SEP-

11 6 (Sep. 2003), available at http://www.icirr.org/dat/pages/Iosingground03.pdf (last visited May 14, 2005); see also Annie Wilson, Reach Out To Refugees,
BALTIMORE SUN, June 20, 2002, at 15A (reporting that President Bush restarted the
Refugee Resettlement program on November 21, 2001). In fiscal year 2002, the maximum number of refugees who could be resettled to the United States was dropped to
70,000. See DHS, 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 6 (Oct. 2003), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) [hereinafter 2002 DHS YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS]. Even this lowered limit was
not reached: "Refugee arrivals into the United States decreased from almost 69,000 in
fiscal year 2001 to 27,000 in fiscal year 2002." Id. at 52.
42. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: How
CHANGES TO U.S. LAW & POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
27-28 (2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us._law/loss/imbalance/
powers.pdf (last visited May 13, 2005) [hereinafter IMBALANCE OF POWERS].
43. See Erin Patrick, The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, MIGRATION POL'Y INST.
INSIGHT, June 2004, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=229#3 (last visited May 13, 2005).
44. See id.
45. Letter from U.S. Representatives Chris H. Smith (R-NJ) and Howard Berman
(D-CA), and U.S. Senators Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) to
President George W. Bush (July 31, 2003), available at http://www.refugeecouncilusa.
org/trto__gwb-7-31-03.pdf (last visited May 13, 2005).
46. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION,
SUMMARY OF REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FISCAL YEAR 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/37128.pdf (last visited May 13, 2005) [hereinafter REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS 2004].
TEMBER
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in the United States in 2004 was still significantly below the
70,000 target that had been set by the President for the year and
well below the pre-September 11 th level of 90,000 refugees.4 7 In
March 2005, the Refugee Council USA warned that the number
of refugees brought to safety by the United States through this
program might actually fall again in 2005 due to U.S. funding
shortfalls.4 s
E. The Smart Border Pact and the Safe Third Country Agreement

On December 12, 2001, the United States and Canada entered into a Smart Border Declaration,4 9 which was described as
an effort to increase security and streamline border crossings.50
Among the thirty action items in this Smart Border Declaration
was an item that Canada had long wanted - a Safe Third Country Agreement. 5 ' Such an agreement, modeled partly on similar
arrangements between European States, 52 would significantly decrease the number of people seeking asylum in Canada by forc47. See Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Washington Update, Dec. 20, 2004, available at www.hias.org/News/Archives/Dec04.html (last visited May 14, 2005); see also REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2004, supra note 46.
48. See REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, FEWER REFUGEES BEING RESCUED, available at http:/
/www.refugeecouncilusa.org/pr-3-21-05-w.pdf (last visited May 14, 2005).
49. See Canadian Embassy, Washington D.C., Building a Smart Borderfor the 21st
Century, available at http://www.canadianembassy.org/border/index-en.asp (last modified Mar. 24, 2005).
50. Former Director of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, said the goal of the Smart
Border Agreement was "to make North America more secure and more prosperous."
He also declared that the plan would facilitate border crossing for the "average U.S. or
Canadian resident." U.S., Canada Sign "Smart Border" Declaration, CNN.coM, Dec. 13,
2001, available at http:/ /archives.cnn.com/ 2001/US/12/12/ rec.canada.border/.
51. Family Unity, Other Issues Discussed at House Hearing on the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement, 79(41) INTERPRETER RELEASES 1570 (Oct. 21, 2002) [hereinafter INTERPRETER RELEASES-FAMILY UNITY] ("Kelly Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, noted that Canada
has had a longstanding interest in concluding such an agreement with the [United
States]. She said that approximately one-third of the persons who apply for asylum in
Canada pass through the U.S. first. Negotiations between the two countries intensified
from 1995 to 1997, but were then abandoned, Ms. Ryan explained. Canada raised the
issue of drafting a safe third country agreement again after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001."); see also Bill Frelick, Whos on First? The Canada-U.S.Memorandum of
Agreement on Asylum, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 219 (Feb. 26, 1996).
52. See Canadian Council for Refugees, Comments on Proposed Agreement for
Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third
Countries (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.web.net/-ccr/commentss3c.html
(last visited May 14, 2005). See generally JOANNE VAN SELM, UNHCR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE IN CONNECTION WITH UNCHR GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS
ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, ACCESS TO PROCEDURES: 'SAFE THIRD COUNTRIES,' 'SAFE
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ing some who had transited through the United States on their
way to Canada to apply for asylum in the United States instead.53
There are some exceptions to this scheme, but they are limited.5 4
With the broad border plan viewed as a critical security objective, the United States was willing to agree to this controversial agreement. 55 U.S. officials acknowledged that the Safe Third
Country Agreement itself was not needed to protect U.S. security. 5 6 Instead, asylum-seekers were essentially treated as bargaining chips in the broader effort to ensure Canadian agreement
on other border issues.
The United States and Canada signed the Safe Third Coun(2001), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home?page=search (last visited June 7, 2005).
53. See Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the United States of America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status
Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, Dec. 5, 2002, U.S.-Can., State Dept. No. 0535, 2004 WL 3269854, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/safe-third.html
(last visited May 13, 2005) [hereinafter Safe Third Country Agreement].
54. See id. art. 4. The Agreement contains some family-based exceptions. Section
2 of Article 4 states that:
Responsibility for determining the refugee status claim of any person referred
to in paragraph 1 shall rest with the Party of the receiving country, and not the
Party of the country of last presence, where the other Party determines that
the person:
a. Has in the territory of the other Party at least one family member who has
had a refugee status claim granted or has been granted lawful permission to
remain indefinitely in that other Party's territory; or
b. Has in the territory of the other Party at least one family member, other
than an aunt, uncle, sibling, niece, or nephew, who is at least 18 years of
age and is not ineligible to pursue a refugee status claim in that other
Party's refugee status determination system and has such a claim pending;
or
c. Is an unaccompanied minor; or
d. Arrived in the territory of the other Party:
i. With a validly issued visa or other valid admission document, other than
for transit issued by the other Party; or
ii. Not being required to obtain a visa by only the other Party.
Id. art. 4(2). The Article also contains a "public interest" exception.
55. See INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 51.
56. See United States and Canada Safe Third Country Agreement: HearingBefore the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, of the Comm. on theJudiciary, 107th
Cong. 34 (2002) (Testimony of Kelly Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State) ("We view this not as a counterterrorism measure, but as a separate part of the 30-point action plan, and not tied directly
to counterterrorism . .. it does not directly affect U.S. security. It is important to the
Government of Canada, and it is important for us getting the other objectives of the
border plan ....
).
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN' AND 'TIME LIMIT'
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try Agreement on December 5, 2002. 5 7 After implementing regulations were finalized, the agreement went into effect at the
U.S.-Canada border on December 29, 2004.58 Ironically, of the
many immigration and security issues at the border, the process
for handling asylum claims had actually worked quite well.
Groups that worked with refugees in the border areas expressed
their concern that the agreement would dismantle this orderly
border process and could actually undermine security by leaving
refugees vulnerable to exploitation by smugglers.59
II. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ("DHS")

On March 1, 2003, the INS was abolished and its functions
transferred to the new DHS.60 The mission of DHS, which is
spelled out in the Homeland Security Act, 6 1 is to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the

United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage from terrorist attacks.6 2 Although DHS is now the place where refugee

protection decisions are made, the Department's mission statement lacks any mention of ensuring that the United States lives
up to its obligations to refugees seeking asylum - obligations
contained in U.S. law and international treaties.63

Given this emphasis on security, and the absence of empha57. See Safe Third Country Agreement; see also IMBALANCE OF POWERS, supra note

42, at 37.
58. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada-U.S.Safe Third Country Agreement (Dec. 29, 2004), at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/menu-safethird.html(last
visited Apr. 15, 2005).
59. See CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, 10 REASONS WHY SAFE THIRD COUNTRY IS

A BAD DEAL (Feb. 2005), at http://www.web.net/-ccr/lOreasons.html (last visited May
14, 2005); see also Vermont Refugee Assistance and the Vermont Immigration Project,
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.vermontrefugeeassistance.org/
faqs.html#eleven (last visited Mar. 30, 2005); IMBALANCE OF POWERS, supra note 42, at
37-38.
60. See USCIS, INS Into DHS: Where Is It Now?, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/
orther/gov/roadmap.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
61. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in various sections of 6 U.S.C. (2002)).
62. See 6 U.S.C. § 101(b)(1) (2002).
63. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, The DHS Strategic Plan - Securing Our
Homeland, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0413.xml
(last visited Apr. 14, 2005). But see INA, § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. 1254(a) (2005); INA,
§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101 (2005), and U.S. Immigration Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C. (1980)) (adopting the
Refugee Convention's definition of a refugee and making nonrefoulement mandatory).
See 1967 Protocol.
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sis on refugee protection, asylum issues were to some extent destined to fall between the many cracks at the DHS. This risk was
exacerbated by the bureaucratic structure of DHS, which separated the enforcement and service functions of the old INS into
different bureaus within the new Department.
While the legal and operational expertise on asylum rests
with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), the
authority over the detention of asylum-seekers falls under the
separate Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE"), which is part of a separate enforcement directorate
(Border and Transportation Security) .64 Yet another enforcement bureau, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
("CBP"), has authority over immigration inspections and expedited removal, a summary deportation process in effect at U.S.
airports and borders.6 5 One additional complication is that the
ICE trial attorneys, who act in effect as prosecutors in immigration court cases, do not report to the asylum legal experts in
USCIS - even when taking legal positions on interpretations of
asylum law, which they must necessarily do in almost every asylum case. 6 6
Immediately after DHS took over INS functions, ninety
faith-based, human rights, refugee assistance, and non-profit legal organizations around the country wrote to the Secretary of
DHS (then Tom Ridge) to raise concerns about having immigration functions relating to asylum-seekers divided into three separate DHS bureaus. 67 That letter, and a detailed briefing paper
prepared by Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers Commit64. See Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement ("ICE"), ICE Detention
and Removal Operations, at http://www.ice.gov/graphics/dro/index.htm (last visited
May 14, 2005); see also REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND THE NEW DHS, supra note 7;
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 7.
65. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, About CBP: Mission, at http://
www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2005); see also
HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST,
IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW 20 (2004), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/libertys-shadow/LibertysShadow.pdf
(last visited
May 14, 2005) [hereinafter IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW].
66. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 20; see also DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE HOMELAND SECURITY AcT REOR-

11-12 (2003), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/insight_4-2003.pdf.
67. See Letter From Human Rights First to the Honorable Thomas Ridge, Re: Detention of Asylum Seekers (Mar. 30, 2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-laws/uslaw-let_032003.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2005) [hereinafter HRF
Letter]; see also REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND THE NEW DHS, supra note 7.
GANIZATION
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tee for Human Rights), recommended that a number of safeguards be put in place within DHS to ensure that its policies and
practices were consistent with refugee protection obligations
under U.S. and international law.68 In November 2003, Human
Rights First began urging Secretary Ridge to create a high-level
refugee protection position to ensure the proper resolution of
refugee issues that cut across DHS bureaus.69
More than two years after the transfer of asylum matters to
DHS, those safeguards have still not been implemented. As a
result, a lack of coordination still exists within DHS on various
refugee and asylum issues. The problem has been especially evident in situations involving issues that cut across more than one
DHS bureau.70

In a report issued in February 2005, the bi-partisan U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom ("USCIRF" or
the "Commission") concluded that there are serious impediments to communication within DHS.7 1 The Commission had
conducted a comprehensive study relating to asylum-seekers in
expedited removal7 2 and detention, and outlined some of these
difficulties in its report:
Four different components of DHS are now involved in Expe68. See HRF Letter, supra note 67.
69. See Letter From Elisa Massimino, Director, Washington Office, Human Rights
First, to Thomas J. Ridge, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security (Nov. 5, 2003),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/ridgeietter110503.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2005); see also IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 45-48.
70. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 20 (discussing the lack of communication between ICE and USCIS); see also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ("USCIRF"), 1 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL
51-52 (2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum-refugees/
2005/february/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) [hereinafter USCIRF STUDY, VOL.
1]. In August 2003, a group of leading Jewish organizations raised concerns about the
U.S. practice of prosecuting asylum seekers. The groups did not receive any response
to their substantive questions. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 20.
71. See USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 1, supra note 70, at 5; see also HUMAN RiGHTS FIRST,
NEW REPORT FROM U.S. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM COMMISSION EXPOSES BARRIERS FACING REF-

UGEES (2005), at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005_alerts/asy_0208-relig.
htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
72. Expedited removal is a summary deportation process. If an immigration officer determines that an alien arriving in the United States is inadmissible under 8
U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or § 1182(a)(7), the officer shall order the alien removed
from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates
either an intention to apply for asylum under section 8 U.S.C.A. 1158 or a fear of persecution, in which case, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum
officer. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
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dited Removal. Under the current structure of DHS, any differences among these agencies must be resolved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security. This makes it
exceedingly difficult to address inter-bureau issues regarding
Expedited Removal, as those officials already oversee an amalgamation of 22 former federal agencies, including INS. As a
practical matter, procedural difficulties regarding credible
fear, parole, and conditions of detention cannot compete
with the myriad of demands on the Secretary's time and attention and indeed should be resolved at lower levels ....
While the refugee and asylum programs are housed within
USCIS at DHS, neither USCIS nor any other office has been
given the authority to resolve, or even to act as a forum on,
inter-bureau issues relating to the impact of Expedited Removal on asylum-seekers and refugees. Rather, DHS has relied on ad hoc "working groups" to address particular issues
after they arise.73
To address this problem, the Commission urged that DHS
create an office, headed by a high-level official, authorized to
address cross-cutting asylum issues like expedited removal and
detention.7 ' The creation of this office was, in fact, the Commission's number one recommendation. In its report, the Commission made clear that this kind of mechanism was necessary to
ensure that all of its other important recommendations were implemented and maintained.7 5
III. THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: A DROP IN
RELEASE RATES AND THE RISE IN NATIONALITY
BASED POLICIES
The plight of detained asylum-seekers has become more
73. See USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 1 supra note 70, at 63-64. For a discussion of the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom report, see Human Rights First, Asylum Protection News # 36, New Homeland Security Secretary Should Make Reforms for
Refugees (Feb. 24, 2005), at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/torchlight/
newsletter/newslet_36.htm (last visited May 14, 2005).
74. See USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 1, supra note 70, at 8.
75. See id. at 15. The need to implement this recommendation - which had also
been advanced by Human Rights First - has been recognized by the new DHS Secretary. On July 14, 2005, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff announced that he would seek
to create a senior asylum policy position. The mandate and functions of this proposed
position had not been announced as of the publication of this Article. See Media Alert,
Human Rights First, Homeland Security to Create Senior Refugee Position (July 13,
2005) available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/media_room.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
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precarious since September 11 th.76 As noted above, the government's authority to detain immigrants was expanded by regulations shortly after the attacks.7 7 This expanded authority was
transferred to the new DHS when it took over INS functions in
March 2003.78
In the years since September 11th, it has become increasingly difficult for asylum-seekers to obtain release from immigration detention.7 9 At the same time, the DOJ and DHS have initiated nationality-based detention policies targeting Haitian asylum-seekers and asylum-seekers from thirty-three nations and
two territories - mostly Middle Eastern and other Islamic countries and territories.8" Under these initiatives, federal authorities
invoked national security concerns to justify new policies that
called for the detention of asylum-seekers who presented no risk
to the public.8 1 In fact, these policies have actually deprived
those asylum-seekers of the opportunity to demonstrate that they
do not present a risk and instead merit release on parole.
A. The Drop in Release Rates
In January 2004, Human Rights First released the results of
76. See discussion supra Part I.C.
77. See Richard Lacayo, More Eyes On You; Do the Feds Need More Power to Fight Terrorism? The Attorney General Says Yes, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, at 66 (noting that in late September of 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft extended the maximum detention
time for immigrants from 24 to 48 hours); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 48, 334 (Sept. 20, 2001)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 287.3(d)) (order modifying the Code of Federal Regulations
dealing with immigration and naturalization, allowing law enforcement officials to detain immigrants for up to 48 hours while determining their naturalization status); see
also Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909, 54,910 (Oct. 31, 2001)
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19).
78. See Michael D. Patrick, Immigration Law Detention Without Bond, N.Y.LJ., May 28,
2003, at 3.
79. See 2 USCIRF REPORT ON AsYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 332-33
(2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylumrefugees/2005/
february/index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) [hereinafter USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 2] (reporting a significant drop in the rate at which local immigration officers have released
asylum seekers on parole from these jail-like facilities in the years since September
11th); see also Nina Bernstein, Out of Repression, Into Jail; Detention for Asylum-Seekers is
Routine, but U.S. is Taking Another Look, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 2004, at BI.
80. See Press Release, DHS, Operation Liberty Shield (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/pressrelease/pressrelease_O1l5.xml
(last
visited Apr. 25, 2005) ("Asylum applicants from nations where al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda sympathizers, and other terrorist groups are known to have operated will be detained for
the duration of their processing period.").
81. See infta note 97 and accompanying text; see also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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a survey of pro bono attorneys and legal service providers around
the country. The survey indicated that it had become even more
difficult for asylum-seekers to obtain release from detention on
parole since September 11th. Attorneys who worked with asylum-seekers in California, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, Washington DC, and other places reported
that asylum-seekers who met the government's parole criteria
were increasingly denied release from detention.8 2 In some areas, attorneys had been told that a "policy of blanket parole denial"
was in effect, though no such policy had been made public.813
The results of this survey were later confirmed when statistics on the detention of asylum-seekers were released. 8 4 A statistical analysis conducted by USCIRF revealed that there had in
fact been a significant drop in the rate at which asylum-seekers
were released on parole.8" Between 2001 and 2003, the release
rate fell by twenty-seven percent.8 6 While in some areas of the
country, asylum-seekers continued to be released from detention, in other places the chances of being released on parole
plummeted. For example, between 2001 and 2003, the release
rate fell by 69.5% in Los Angeles, by 34.9% in Michigan, by
85.6% in Maryland and by 99.2% in New Orleans. In New
Jersey, the already low release rate of 16.2% fell by 77.7%, down
to 3.6% in fiscal year 2003.87
There are probably several reasons for these drops in release rates. While some asylum-seekers found themselves detained for the duration of their asylum proceedings under new
blanket detention policies, others were detained longer because
of shifts in local release practices.8 8 Moreover, as the number of
82. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 17.

83. Id.
84. See generally USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 2, supra note 79; Nina Bernstein & Marc
Santora, Asylum Seekers Treated Poorly, U.S. Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at Al
(noting that the bipartisan report by USCIRF found that asylum seekers were being
treated like criminals while their claims were evaluated).
85. See USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 2, supra note 79, at 332.
86. See id. The national release rate for asylum seekers dropped from 86.1% in
fiscal year 2001 down to 62.5% in fiscal year 2003. See id.
87. The release rate for asylum seekers in Los Angeles dropped from 98% in fiscal
year 2001 down to 29.8% in fiscal year 2003; in Michigan the rate dropped from 76.9%
to 50%; in Maryland the rate dropped from 38.9% to 5.6%; and in New Orleans, it
dropped from 71.1% to 0.5%. See id. at 332-33.
88. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 27-28.
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new asylum-seekers has dipped, more space may have become
available in some areas - giving local immigration officials the
chance to fill a higher proportion of detention beds with asylumseekers who might otherwise have been released on parole. 9
The official release criteria themselves have not changed.
The relevant regulations and parole guidelines specifically prohibit the parole of anyone who would be barred from asylum or
would present a risk to the community. 0 Yet, just as in other
areas of immigration decision-making, immigration officers may
be much more likely to say "no" than they were in the years
before September 11th."
But whatever the immediate explanation, it is the underlying flaws in the asylum detention system that have left it susceptible to these unexplained shifts in practices and to blanket policies that aim to prevent individualized decision-making. Chief
among these flaws are the lack of independent review of the decision to detain an asylum-seeker and the failure to codify the
release guidelines into enforceable regulations.9 2 The system,
essentially, lacks the kinds of safeguards that help to prevent detention from becoming arbitrary under international human
89. See DHS, 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 52 (Sept. 2004), available

at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook (last visited Apr. 25, 2005)
(noting that the number of new and reopened applications for asylum dropped by
27%, from 63,197 in fiscal year 2002 to 46,272 in fiscal year 2003).
90. See DHS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (2004) (prohibiting parole of anyone who is a security risk); see also Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson,
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") Executive Associate Commissioner for
Field Operations, to Regional Directors, District Directors, and Asylum Office Directors,
Expedited Removal: Additional Policy Guidelines, Dec. 30, 1997 (specifying that parole
is only a viable option for asylum seekers who meet certain criteria and "are not subject
to any possible bars to asylum involving violence or misconduct"). The 1997 INS Guidelines detail procedures to be followed if some concern arises that an individual may be a
security risk, may be subject to a terrorist bar or may otherwise be a danger to the
community. See id. These procedures include an investigation and inquiries to the FBI
and other appropriate agencies. See id.; see also Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson,

INS Executive Associate Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, to Regional Directors, Detention Guidelines Effective October 9, 1998, (Oct. 7, 1998), reprinted in 75
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1508 (1998)

(providing that "it is INS policy to favor release of

aliens found to have a credible fear of persecution, provided that they do not pose a
risk of flight or danger to the community" (emphasis added).
91. This phenomenon is referred to as the "culture of no." See, e.g., Business vBush,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003.

See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 7, at 9 (discussing the post 9-11 "zero tolerance" policy
and the "culture of no").
92. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 8, 11.
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rights law.9 3
B. OperationLiberty Shield
On March 17, 2003, on the eve of war with Iraq, DHS announced that as part of Operation Liberty Shield, it would detain for the duration of their asylum proceedings, asylum-seekers
from nations and territories "where al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda sympathizers, and other terrorist groups are known to have operated."94 Under Operation Liberty Shield, arriving asylum-seekers - even those who met the relevant parole criteria and
presented no risk to the public - were to be detained for the
duration of their asylum proceedings if they were seeking refuge
from one of the targeted States or territories.9 5 The effect of
Operation Liberty Shield was to deprive asylum-seekers from
these mostly Arab or Muslim nations of the opportunity to have
the necessity of their detention assessed on an individualized basis96
The justification of this measure was national security,
though it called for the detention of even those asylum-seekers
who were not a risk to the public. Secretary Ridge issued a written statement on March 18, 2003, stating that "these heightened
security measures will help deter 9terrorism
and increase protec7
Americans.
and
America
of
tion
93. See Eleanor Acer, Living up to America's Values: Reforming the U.S. Detention System
for Asylum Seekers, REFUGE, May 2002, at 49 (discussing the U.S. system for detaining
asylum seekers and noting various ways in which it is not consistent with international
law and standards).
94. See Press Release, DHS, Operation Liberty Shield (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4234 (last visited May 14, 2005); see
also Cam Simpson, US. on Alert for "Lone WolfAttacks, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2003, at C3
(discussing DHS changes in immigration policy following the U.S. invasion of Iraq).
95. See id.
96. See UN Agency Says U.S. Automatic Detention of Some Asylum Seekers 'Dangerous',
AFX EUROPEAN Focus, Mar. 21, 2003 (noting that Operation Liberty Shield lacks individual assessment of security risk posed by specific individuals); see also Human Rights
First, Asylum Protection News #12, Department of Homeland Security Targets Asylum Seekers for
Detention, Mar. 19, 2003, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/torchlight/news
letter/newslet_12.htm (last visitedJune 7, 2005); Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR Concerned About U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers (Mar. 21, 2003).
97. Press Release, Operation Liberty Shield: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=519 (last visited May 14, 2005) (noting that DHS refused to officially disclose the list of affected nationalities, stating that the complete list was "law enforcement sensitive"). The list appears to have included Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait,
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Immediately after the policy was announced, numerous civil
rights, faith-based, human rights, and refugee advocacy organizations expressed their concern about it. 8 Bishop Thomas G.
Wenski, on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops'
Committee on Migration, expressed concern that the policy
"harms individuals who are fleeing terror, is inappropriately discriminatory, violates accepted norms of international law, and
undermines our tradition as a safe haven for the oppressed."9
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees expressed concern
that the policy's association of asylum-seekers and refugees with
terrorism is "dangerous and erroneous," and stressed that asylum-seekers "have themselves escaped acts of persecution and violence, including terrorism, and have proven time and again
that they are the victims and not the perpetrators of these attacks."'
Operation Liberty Shield was officially terminated at the
end of April 2003.1°1 According to DHS, forty-two people were
Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United
Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen as well as Gaza and the West Bank. See Ricardo
Alonso-Zaldivar, Showdown With Iraq; Rights Groups Blast Policy to Detain Asylum Seekers,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at 12.
98. The policy was criticized by various groups, including Amnesty International
USA, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, the Episcopal Migration Ministries, the
Ethiopian Community Development Council, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society,
Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (now Human Rights
First), the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. See, e.g.,
Michael Welch, Quiet Constructions in the War on Terror: SubjectingAsylum Seekers to Unnecessary Detention, 31 Soc. JUST. 113 (2004) (noting the opposition of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, and the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children); Press Release, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, HIAS Alarmed by DHS' Detention of Asylum Seekers: Policy Leaves
Most Vulnerable at Risk (Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://www.hias.org/News/
news03.html (last visited May 14, 2005).
99. Statement of Bishop Thomas G. Wenski, Auxiliary Bishop of Miami, Chairman,
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Committee on Migration, on Operation Liberty
Shield (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usccb.org/mrs/wenlib.shtml (last visited May 14, 2005).
100. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Appeals for Protection of Asylum-Seekers in the United States, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq?
page=news&id=3e7b27384 (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
101. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 25; see also Asa Hutchinson, Remarks to the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (May
7, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=628 (last visited
May 14, 2005) (noting that Operation Liberty Shield was terminated on April 17, 2003);
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detained as a result of the policy. 0 2 Even after the policy was
terminated, attorneys around the country continued to report
that asylum-seekers from Arab and Muslim countries were being
routinely detained for the duration of their asylum proceedings103

C. The Haitian Detention Policy
In early December 2001, a boat carrying about 170 Haitian
men, women, and children arrived off the coast of Florida.1 °4
The INS instituted a blanket policy of denying parole to these
and other Haitian asylum-seekers.10 5 In October 2002, a second
boat arrived, with more than 200 Haitian men, women and children swimming ashore near Key Biscayne, Florida." 6 Unlike the
first group of Haitians, these asylum-seekers - simply because
they had set foot on land before being detained - were entitled
to seek their release in1 a7 bond re-determination hearing before
an immigration judge. 1
The Bush Administration took several steps in an apparent
attempt to deprive these and other Haitian asylum-seekers of any
right to an individualized determination of the need for their
detention: first, Haitian asylum-seekers who came to the United
States by sea and whose detention was exclusively under the control of the INS, were subject to the INS and DHS policy of denying parole.1 0 8
see also Human Rights First, Asylum Protection News #15, Operation Liberty Shield Quietly
Terminated, May 15, 2003, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/torchlight/
newsletter/newslet_15.htm (last visited June 7, 2005).
102. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 25.
103. See id. at 24-25.
104. See id. at 25; see also WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT: THE UNITED STATES AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DENY HAITIANS PROTECTION 20 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.womenscommission.org/
pdf/ht.pdf(last visited Aug. 22, 2005) [hereinafter REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT]; Bill Frelick,

"Abundantly Clear". Refoulement, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 245 (discussing U.S. history of
refoulement of Haitian asylum seekers, including the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) and the Bush Administration's
return of Haitians in 2000).
105. See REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 104, at 22.

106. See id. at 30.
107. See IMBALANCE OF POWERS, supra note 42, at 30.
108. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 22; see also Deborah Sharp, 6
Charged With Attempting to Smuggle Haitians,USA TODAY, Oct. 31, 2002, at 5A (reporting
the Bush Administration's "quietly changed ... detention policy on Haitians," set up to
deter a "mass exodus" from Haiti). See generally REFUGEE POLICY ADRFT, supra note 104,
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The INS also began taking steps to suspend immigration
judges' decisions to release asylum-seekers on bond, an implementation of the INS's recently expanded detention power.'0 9
In November 2002, The DOJ and INS issued a notice authorizing expedited removal of Haitian and other migrants who arrive
by sea." ° The notice cited a "surge" in illegal migration by sea
which "threaten[ed] national security" because it caused a diversion in U.S. Coast Guard resources."' The notice reflected
DOJ's intent to preclude Haitians arriving in the future from
having the right to seek release from detention from an immi12
gration judge.
In March 2003, the new DHS asked the Attorney General to
review a Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board") decision to release an eighteen year-old Haitian asylum-seeker on
bond, and to order stays of other Haitian release decisions." 3
On April 17, 2003, in a sweeping decision, the Attorney General
concluded that for national security reasons, the Haitian teenager was not entitled to an individualized assessment of the need
for his detention. In the decision In re D-J-,
the Attorney
General directed immigration judges and the BIA to consider
national security arguments in future detention custody deciat 30; Editorial, Justice Denied, Again for Haitian Asylum Seekers, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 18,
2002; Jody Benjamin, INS Admits New Get-Tough Policy on HaitiansAimed at Preventing
Exodus, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 20, 2002; Alfonso Chardy, INS Clamps Down on Haitian Asylum-Seekers, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 20, 2002.
109. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 22; see also Margaret H. Taylor,
Dangerous By Decree: Detention Without Bond In Immigration Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. REV.
149, 164-67 (2004).
110. The authorization excluded Cubans. See Notice Designating Aliens Subject to
Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b) (1) (A) (iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924 (Nov. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Expedited Removal Notice];
see also INS Order 2243-02, Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal
Under Section 235(b) (1) (A) (iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg.
68,924, 68,925 (Nov. 13, 2002) [hereinafter INS Order 2243-02].
111. Expedited Removal Notice, supra note 110, at 68,924; see IN LIBERTY'S
SHADOW, supra note 65, at 22.
112. See Expedited Removal Notice, supra note 110, at 68,924-26; see also IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 22; INS Order 2243-02, supra note 110.

113. See DHS Under Secretary for Border & Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson, Referral of Decision to the Attorney General, Mar. 20, 2003; see also National Immigration Law Center, AG's Precedent DecisionDenies Haitian'sRelease on Bond Based on Generalized NationalSecurity Concerns, 17 IMMIGRANTS' RTS. UPDATE 3,

able at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/ad065.htm
2005); IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 23.

4 (June 3, 2003), avail-

(last visited Apr. 23,
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sions. 14
contained
The Attorney General's explanation in D-Jno allegation that the asylum-seeker, David Joseph, presented
any risk to the public. Instead, the Attorney General concluded
that if Joseph and others were released, their release "would
come to the attention of others in Haiti," which would "encourage future surges in illegal migration by sea," which in turn
would "injure national security by diverting valuable Coast
Guard and Department of Defense resources from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities."1 1' 5 The Attorney
General also asserted that the U.S. government lacked the resources to adequately screen the Haitians prior to release,
presenting an additional security risk. This concern, the Attorney General explained, was supported by the State Department's
assertion "that it has observed an increase in aliens from countries such as Pakistan using Haiti as a staging point for migration
to the United States." 11 6
The tenuous and convoluted nature of this "security" justification - which essentially argued that any diversion of U.S. resources would implicate homeland security - sparked widespread concern that the language of "security" was being used to
mask what was actually a discriminatory detention policy.11 7 The
Haitian policy, like the Operation Liberty Shield detention policy, targeted asylum-seekers for extended detention based on
their nationality. 18
These policies provide yet another example of the ways in
which post September 11th policies have violated the human
23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 579 (A.G. 2003); see also Taylor, supra
114. See In re D-J-,
note 109, at 165-69.
115. Id. at 579.
116. Id. at 580-81.
117. Statement of Most Reverend Thomas Wenski, Auxiliary Bishop of Miami and
Chairman, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee on Migration,
May 1, 2003 (expressing deep concern about Attorney General Ashcroft's decision, and
concluding that "[s] uch systematic and discriminatory treatment of those who seek safe
haven undermines our tradition as a defender of human rights and further erodes U.S.
leadership and moral authority around the world"), available at http://www.usccb.org/
mrs/wenhaiasy.shtml; see also Press Release, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, HIAS Issue
May Day Warning, Rights of Immigrants Evaporating (May 1, 2003), available at
www.HIAS.org; Susan Benesch, Haitians Trapped by "War on Terrorism, " AMNESTY MAGAZINE (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/haiti.html.
118. See Brief for Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights) as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Moise v. Bulger, 321 F.3d 1336 (11th
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-13009-D), at 22.
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rights of refugees. By depriving asylum-seekers of individualized
assessments of the need for their detention and instead detaining them based on their nationality, the various measures directed at Haitian asylum seekers were inconsistent with basic
human rights law prohibitions against non-discrimination and
arbitrary detention. 1 9
IV. THE IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL CASES
The difficulties facing individual asylum-seekers who are trying to prove their eligibility for asylum have also multiplied in
the time since September 11th. Some may be affected by the
new bars to asylum under the PATRIOT Act or by the Safe Third
Country Agreement with Canada. Many, however, have been affected by shifts in practice that have simply made it much more
difficult to receive asylum. Attorneys at Human Rights First, who
provide legal support in hundreds of asylum cases each year,
have noticed that asylum officers and immigration judges seem
to be requiring increasingly higher levels of proof to establish
eligibility for asylum in individual cases.
In the time since September 11th, the rate at which U.S.
asylum officers have granted asylum in individual cases has
dropped. In 2000, about forty-four percent of asylum cases were
granted by the U.S. Asylum Office. By 2003, that number had
dropped by thirty-four percent, down to about twenty-nine per0
cent.

12

Also troubling is the dramatic drop in the approval of asylum appeals at the BIA.12 1 On February 6, 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft publicly announced plans to make dramatic
changes to speed up the way that the BIA, the administrative
board that reviews the decisions of immigration judges, considers and decides cases pending before it. 122 The changes were
described as necessary to tackle the significant backlog of cases
119. See generally id.; Acer, supra note 93.
120. The number of cases granted is based on the number of cases adjudicated,
not on the total number of cases received. See USCIS, FISCAL YEAR 2003 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, (last modified Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://uscis.gov/
graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/RA2003yrbk/RAExcel/Tablel6.xls.
121. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 27.
122. See id. at 25. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") is part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, an agency that is part of the U.S. Department of
Justice.
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at the BIA and to promote national security. 12 3 Ashcroft cited
the September l1th attacks in justifying these changes, stating
that:
[O]ur [N] ation's security demands that our immigration laws
be enforced efficiently, fairly and without delay. In the wake
of the September 11 th occurrences of last year, such concerns
rise to a new level of importance. Today's announced reorganization of the Board of Immigration Appeals
will meet
24
these objectives while protecting due process.'
The Attorney General's changes included provisions that:
(1) required individual BIA members to review and decide most
cases with one-sentence orders; (2) limited the BIA's scope of
review; and (3) decreased the time for asylum-seekers to file appellate briefs. 125 The DOJ also announced that it would reduce
the number of BIA adjudicators from twenty-three to eleven sending a clear message thatjobs were on the line.' 26 The Board
itself, shortly after this announcement, took its own steps to
1 27
speed up decisions in asylum cases.
The changes made at the Board in 2002 have undermined
the ability of asylum-seekers to obtain a full and fair hearing on
their claims, leading essentially to the BIA's "rubber-stamping"
of immigration judge denials in many asylum cases.128 Prior to
123. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Transcript of News Conference - Administrative Change to Board of Immigration Appeals (Feb. 6, 2002), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/020602transcriptadministrativechangetobia.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
124. Id.
125. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1), (d)(3), (e)(4)(ii) (2005); see also Press Release,
U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Attorney General Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration Appeals Procedures (Aug. 23, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2002/August/02_eoir_.489.htm (last visited May 14, 2005).
126. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (a) (1). Only 19 of the Board's 23 positions were filled at
the time that the Attorney General announced the proposed changes.
127. See Memorandum from Lori L. Scialabba, Acting Chairman, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Bd. of Immigration Appeals, Use of Summary Affirmance Orders in Asylum and
Cancellation Cases (Mar. 15, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/genifo/
stream.htm (authorizing the use of summary affirmances in asylum and withholding
cases under prior streamlining authority). See also Lisa Getter & Jonathan Peterson,
Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed; Ashcrofl's Goal to Clear Backlog of Immigration
Appeals Has Board Members Deciding Cases in Minutes; Increasingly, ForeignersAre Losing,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at 1.
128. Getter & Peterson, supra note 127. See also ABA Comm. on Immigration Policy, Practice & Pro Bono, Seeking Meaningful Review: Findings and Recommendations in
Response to Dorsey & Whitney Study of Board of Immigration Appeals ProceduralReforms (Oct.
2003) available at http://www.abanet.org/immigration/bia.pdf.
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these changes, the BIA typically decided cases by three-judge
panels and granted twenty-five percent of these appeals. 129 Since
then, the numbers have changed markedly. A law firm working
with Human Rights First analyzed about 1400 asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture cases decided
by the BIA in September 2002."0 In approximately eighty percent of these cases, a single BIA adjudicator affirmed the decision of the immigration judge in a one-sentence opinion."'
Moreover, the BIA granted asylum, withholding of removal, or
Convention Against Torture relief in less than five percent of
these cases.

1 2

The Los Angeles Times conducted a review of BIA decisions
made between February and October 2002, and concluded that
board members "are reviewing cases individually and ruling
within minutes, often issuing just two-line decisions."' 3 3 The
newspaper's review of BIA statistics led it to observe that "as the
number of cases decided by the board has soared, so has the rate
at which board members have ruled against foreigners facing de'13 4
portation.'
The steep drop in the approval of asylum appeals was also
documented by the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom. In its February 2005 report, the Commission noted
that although the BIA sustained twenty-four percent of asylum
appeals in expedited removal cases in fiscal year 2001, since the
2002 changes, the BIA has granted only two to four percent of
these appeals. 1 5 The Commission noted that "[s] tatistically, it is
highly unlikely that any asylum-seeker denied by an immigration
judge will find protection by appealing to the BIA. "1 6

129. See IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW, supra note 65, at 26.

130. See id. at 26. This information was obtained from the Executive Office for
Immigration Review in the summer of 2003 through a Freedom of Information act
request filed by the law firm of Jones Day on December 19, 2002.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Getter & Peterson, supra note 127, at 1 (quoting former BIA Member Lory
Rosenberg: "[E]mphasis is placed on speed, not legal precision ....
[staff attorneys
are] rewarded for numbers.").
134. Id.
135. See ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 70, at 44.

136. See id.
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V. THE EFFORT TO CHANGE U.S. ASYLUM LAW
While asylum-seekers have been affected by many changes
in policies and practices in the post-September l1th United
States, there was no full-fledged assault on asylum law in the
three years immediately following the attacks. This should
hardly be a surprise. None of the perpetrators of the September
11th attacks were asylum-seekers. The asylum system had, moreover, been substantially overhauled in the mid-1990s, in the wake
of the first attack on the World Trade Center. 13 7 The bottom
line is that U.S. law already bars from asylum anyone who engages in terrorist activity and anyone who is or may reasonably
13
be considered a danger to the security of the United States. 1
Yet some legislators seem to view asylum as an easy target.
Asylum seekers do not vote. 139 Their path to citizenship has for
years been delayed by a statutory limit on the number of asylees
who can receive "green cards" each year. 140 As a result, refugees
who have been granted asylum have had a ten and even fifteen
year wait before they can become legal permanent residents of
the United States. 4 ' In some ways, then, asylum seekers have
137. See
ASYLUM

HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,

SEEKERS

IN

THE

Is

THIS AMERICA?

UNITED

THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO

(2000),
available at http://
process/due-prol.htm (last visited

STATES

www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/reports/due
May 14, 2005); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ASYLUM REFORM:
FIVE YEARS LATER 7-8 (2000), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/
asylum_brochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
138. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). U.S. law also requires that multiple security checks be conducted on each and every asylum applicant.
See Human Rights First, Security Procedures in the U.S. Asylum System (Aug. 2004), at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/pdf/asylumsecurity.pdf.
139. See LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE, POCKET KNOWLEDGE 6
(2003), available at http://www.lirs.org/InfoRes/PDFs/PocketKnowledge.pdf (last visited May 13, 2005) (listing rights of asylees); see alsoJaminB. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local
Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional,and TheoreticalMeanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 1391, 1461 (1993) (noting that no State permits noncitizens to vote).
140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2005) (setting the annual asylee limit at 10,000). This
"cap" was finally eliminated in May 2005. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, H.R. 1268, 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
141. See USCIS, Adjustment of Status for Asylees (Mar. 18, 2005), at http://uscis.gov/
graphics/fieldoffices/nebraska/asyleeadj.htm (last visited May 15, 2005) (showing that
applications to adjust status received byJanuary 10, 2005 are estimated to be processed
between October 1, 2015 and September 30, 2016); see also Letter from Human Rights
First et al., to U.S. Congress (Feb. 9, 2005),
available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/pdf/realid/sensenbrenneramdsignon020905.pdf
(last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
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perhaps been perceived as a relatively voiceless constituency who
are lacking in significant political clout - and an easy target for
officials who want to demonstrate that they can be "tough" on
immigration and security.
Beginning in late 2004, some members of the U.S. House of
Representatives attempted to add a number of changes to U.S.
asylum law to the legislation implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.' 4 2 Although the asylum changes

had not been recommended by the 9/11 Commission, the proponents of these provisions began to use the language of security
to justify these changes and attempted to use the September
4
11th legislation as a vehicle for enacting their proposals. 1
When this attempt failed, they renewed their efforts in early
2005 - combining these provisions with a proposal to restrict
access to driver's licenses in a bill known as the "REAL ID
Act.

14 4

Some of these changes to asylum law had been introduced
14 5
in the U.S. Congress before, but had generated little support.
Others were highly technical changes to burdens of proof, to
standards concerning the reasons for persecution, and to assessments of credibility - changes that sought to overturn the decisions of a number of federal appeals courts and the precedent of
the BIA. 146 One of the most excessive provisions sought to bar

U.S. federal courts from issuing stays of removal to prevent the
deportation of asylum-seekers while their cases are pending
before federal courts.' 4 7 When examined closely, these changes
look more like a sort of "wish list" drafted by government immigration lawyers whose litigation positions had been rejected by
142. See Press Release, Human Rights First, Intelligence Bill Agreement Strikes
Provisions That Harm Refugees (Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://www.humanrights
first.org/media/2004_alerts/asy_l 107_hrl0.htm (last visited May 14, 2005). The 9/11
Commission was created by Congress to investigate the September l1th attacks and
provide recommendations to guard against future attacks. See Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Homepage, at http://www.9-1Icommission.gov/.
143. See infra note 157.
144. See Human Rights First, Senate to Take Up REAL ID Act, Bill Puts Real Lives in
Danger, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum-10 sensenbr.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
145. See id.
146. See Real ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005); see also 9/11
Recommendations Implementation Act, H.R. 10, 108th Cong. § 3007 (2004).
147. See H.R. 418 § 105.
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judges, than a package of changes aimed at protecting U.S. security.
A. The 9/11 Commission Intelligence Bill
The proponents of these anti-asylum measures saw their
chance in the Fall of 2004. The approaching presidential election contributed to the imperative to pass legislation to implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. On October 8,
2004, the House of Representatives passed the "9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act" ("H.R. 10"). ' This House
bill, despite its name, contained a number of provisions that
were not recommended by the bipartisan 9/11 Commission. 4 9
Several of these provisions would have put the lives and
safety of victims of torture and other persecution at risk. H.R. 10
would have made it much more difficult for genuine refugees to
prove their asylum cases, and would have deprived victims of torture and other persecution of meaningful judicial review. 50 For
example, H.R. 10 would have allowed genuine refugees to be
denied asylum if the U.S. Department of State failed to document the problems they faced, if they did not submit corroborating evidence that an adjudicator thought they should be able to
submit, and if they could not prove the "central" reason they
were targeted by persecutors. 1 5 ' The bill also sought to eliminate stays of removal when a case is appealed to a federal court
- so that people in danger of torture or other persecution
could have been returned to the country that would harm them
while their cases were pending before U.S. federal courts. 5 2 Yet
another provision of H.R. 10 would have expanded the use of
expedited removal, depriving some non-citizens of immigration
court hearings prior to deportation when they had been in the
United States for up to five years. 5 3
The proponents of the asylum provisions of H.R. 10 repeatedly asserted that these provisions were needed to protect the
148. 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, H.R. 10.
149. See Letter from 9/11 Comm'n Chair Thomas H. Kean & Vice Chair Lee H.
Hamilton to U.S. Rep. Peter Hoekstra (Oct. 20, 2004), at http://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/asylum/pdf/911-commission-ltr-102004.pdf (last visited May 14, 2005).
150. See, e.g., 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, H.R. 10, §§ 3007(b),
3009.
151. Id. § 3007(a).
152. Id. § 3009.
153. Id. § 3006.
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United States from terrorists. 5 4 Citing to a case relating to the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the bill's proponents neglected to mention that major reforms had been made to the
asylum system after that attack.15 Seizing on public fears of terrorism, House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R.-WI) claimed publicly that "terrorists are getting asylum today."' 5 6 The 9/11 Commission itself though, in an October 2004 letter, stressed that the immigration provisions "are not
Commission recommendations" and stated that "we believe
strongly that this bill is not the right occasion for tackling controversial immigration and law enforcement recommendations." 157
After Congressional negotiators finally reached an agreement, a compromise bill, known as the "Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004," was signed into law by President Bush on December 17, 2004.5' Ultimately, many of the
provisions that would have harmed refugees were not included
in the final legislation. The new law did, however, contain other
immigration-related provisions, including a dramatic increase in
the number of beds available for immigration detention.15 9
Despite the fact that the anti-refugee provisions were struck
from the final bill, the proponents of these asylum provisions,
led by Chairman Sensenbrenner, announced that they would try
to attach these same provisions to the first "must pass" legislation
introduced in the next Congress in January 2005.16 Chairman
154. See Press Release, U.S. Rep. John Hostettler, Border Security and Enforcement Measures Included in 9/11 Commission Legislation (Sept. 28, 2004), availableat
http://www.house.gov/hostettler/Hostetler-news.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). See
also Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on theJudiciary, Sensenbrenner Statement During House Floor Debate on 9/11 Legislation Conference Report
(Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/newscenter.aspx?a=425.
155. See supra note 137-38 and accompanying text; see also Doris Meissner, Letter to
the Editor, Not Broke, Don't Fix, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at B05 (Ms. Meissner is a
former Commissioner of the INS and a senior fellow at the Migration Policy Institute).
156. 150 CONG. REc. H10998 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). But see Meissner, supra note 155.
157. Letter from 9/11 Comm'n Chair Thomas H. Kean & Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton to U.S. Rep. Peter Hoekstra (Oct. 20, 2004), at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
asylum/pdf/911-commission4tr-102004.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
158. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, S.2845, 108th
Cong. (2004).
159. See id. § 5204.
160. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on the Judiciary, Sensenbrenner to Introduce Border Security and Immigration Legislation Dropped From
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Sensenbrenner promised that the new legislation would include
provisions to "tighten" the "asylum system abused by terrorists." 161

B. The REAL ID Act
As promised, in January 2005, Chairman Sensenbrenner
and his colleagues quickly launched their effort to advance many
of the same provisions relating to asylum and to drivers' licenses
that had been excluded from the final intelligence bill. 6 2 Chairman Sensenbrenner stressed that he had received assurances
from House leaders that his bill was a "top priority."' 6 3 On February 10, 2005, the REAL ID Act (H.R. 418) was passed with a
64
261-161 vote margin by the House of Representatives.
This House bill contained a series of provisions that would
have put refugees at significant risk of being deported back into
the hands of their persecutors. Specifically, the bill would have:
(1) allowed a refugee who testifies credibly to be denied asylum
if she is unable to track down documents to confirm or "corroborate" her credible testimony - for instance, where this effort
might endanger her family; (2) required a refugee to prove her
persecutor's "central" reasons for harming her - essentially penalizing a refugee who cannot prove with unrealistic precision
what is going on in her persecutor's mind; and (3) given an immigration officer or immigration judge broad leeway to deny a
refugee asylum based on her "demeanor" or based on any inconsistencies in her prior statements, even minor mistakes in remembering dates that do not relate to her persecution or
9/11 Commission Conference Report (Dec. 8, 2004), available at http://
www.judiciary.house.gov/newcenter.aspx?a=427; see also Matthew L. Wald & David D.
Kirkpatrick, U.S. May Require Closer Scrutiny To Get A License, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2005, at Al; Michelle Mittelstadt, House Votes to Restrict Licensees Critics Say Terror
Being Used as Excuse to Crack Down on Immigrants, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 11,
2005, at 20A. The REAL ID Act as ultimately passed contained improved versions of
these provisions. See infra Part VI(B); see also infra note 170.
161. Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Statement (Jan. 27, 2005), available at www.house.gov/sensenbrenner/wc20050127.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005)
[hereinafter Sensenbrenner Statement].
162. See Mary Curtius, The Nation; GOP Congressman Renews Push for Immigration
Curbs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A18 (discussing Senator Sensenbrenner's new legislation and how his priorities differ from those of the President).
163. Sensenbrenner Statement, supra note 161.
164. See Charlie Savage, Conservative Camps Split on Tightening Asylum, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2005, at Al.
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fears. 165
At the last minute, another harmful provision was added to
the House bill. 1 66 This additional provision, like a similar provision that had been included in the intelligence bill (H.R. 10),
would have prohibited a U.S. federal court from issuing a stay of
removal to prevent an asylum-seeker from being deported back
into the hands of her persecutors while her case is pending
before the U.S. court. The bill also expanded the bars to asylum
to such an extent that it would allow people who bear no personal responsibility for terrorist acts - even the wives and children of victims of extortion by terrorist or militant groups - to
be deported and barred from asylum based on overly broad definitions of "terrorism" and of "supporting" terrorism.16 7

Once again, the proponents of these provisions used the
language of terrorism to defend them. For example, Chairman
Sensenbrenner described the REAL ID Act as "critical to our
anti-terrorism efforts" and claimed that it would "tighten our asylum system, which has been abused by terrorists."16
The Real ID Act was passed by the U.S. Congress on May 10,
2005, as part of an emergency spending bill relating to Iraq and
aid to Tsunami survivors. It was signed into law by President
Bush on May 11, 2005.169 The opponents of the Real ID Act
were successful in maintaining some meaningful judicial review
in asylum cases. The House provision that would have barred
federal court stays of removal for asylum seekers whose cases
were pending before federal courts was eliminated from the final bill. 7 ' At the same time though, the Real ID Act may 165. See Real ID Act, H.R. 418, 109th Cong. § 101 (a) (3) (B) (i)-(iii) (2005); see also
Human Rights First, Senate to Take up REAL ID Act, Bill Puts Real Lives in Danger, at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum-10_sensenbr.asp (last visited Mar. 30,
2005).
166. See H.R. 418 § 105.
167. H.R. 418 §§ 103, 104.
168. Sensenbrenner Statement, supra note 161. But see Meissner, supra note 155.
169. See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13 (2005). See also Press Release, Human
Rights First, REAL ID Endangers People Fleeing Persecution (June 6, 2005), availableat
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylum/asylum 10 sensenbr.asp. Although the
White House had initially expressed concerns about the asylum provisions of the REAL
ID Act, the White House ultimately supported the effort to attach the bill to the emergency spending measure. See Press Release, Human Rights First, House and Senate
Negotiators Include Anti-Refugee Provisions in 'Must-Pass' Spending Bill (May 4, 2005).
170. Compare Real ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418, 109th Cong. (2005) (as introduced in
the U.S. House of Representatives, Jan. 26, 2005), with Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 10913 (2005) (as passed by both the House and Senate, and signed by the President May
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depending on how it is applied (or misapplied) by adjudicators
make it much harder for refugees to prove that they qualify
for asylum in the United States. Under the Real ID Act, refugees
can be denied asylum based on their "demeanor".'7 1 This provision fails to take into account how people from different countries interact with authority figures - in particular, how they talk
about traumatic personal experiences.1 7 2 The REAL ID Act
could also allow a refugee to be denied asylum based on an inconsistency that does not go "to the heart of the applicant's
claim."' 7 3 While the final version of the bill included new language directing adjudicators to consider the "totality of the circumstances" and "all relevant factors when basing credibility determinations on inconsistencies, demeanor, or other factors, the
natural tendency of the asylum provisions of the REAL ID Act
will likely be to provide statutory cover for shoddy decision-making. "174
A refugee could also be denied asylum under this new law if
11, 2005). The final bill also contained a revised version of the proposed "corroboration" requirement - rejecting the approach of the House bill and instead following the
case law of the Board of Immigration Appeals and several federal circuit courts that
assess the reasonableness of the requirement. See Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722
(B.I.A. 1997); Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2000); Qui v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140
(2d Cir. 2003); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001); Mulanga v. Ashcroft,
349 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2003). The final corroboration provision will impact cases arising
within the Ninth Circuit, which had taken a different approach. See Ladha v. INS, 215
F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2004).
171. See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii); see also Anwen
Hughes & American Immigration Law Found., REAL Faces, REAL People: Navigating the
REAL ID Act, Immig. L. Today, July-Aug. 2005, at 17-18 [hereinafter Navigatingthe REAL
ID Act] (noting that the adjudicator is required to consider the "totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors").
172. See Ass'n of the City Bar of New York, Statement in Opposition to the REAL
ID Act (Feb. 9, 2005) available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/REALID.pdf; see
generally Ilene Durst, Lost in Translation: Why Due Process DemandsDeference to the Refugee's
Narrative,53 RUTGERS L. REv. 127, 128 (2000) (arguing that "a[m]any negative determinations of credibility can be explained by the inability of the asylum applicant, or his
attorney, to translate the persecution suffered into a narrative graspable by the adjudicator, and/or the adjudicator's inability to transcend the barriers created by the inherent otherness of trauma, culture, and language.").
173. See Navigating the REAL ID Act, supra note 171, at 16 (arguing that statutory
language indicates that alleged inconsistency must still be relevant to claim, even
though it does not go to the heart of it). The Real ID Act allows immigration judges
making credibility assessments of asylum applicants to take into account inaccuracies in
their statements "without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
goes to the heart of the applicant's claim, or any other relevantfactor." See Real ID Act of
2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 101 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (emphasis added).
174. See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 101(a) (3) (B) (iii) (codified as
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she can't show that race, religion, nationality, social group membership or political opinion is "at least one central reason" for
her past or feared persecution. 7 5 The Real ID Act will also allow
people who bear no personal responsibility for terrorist acts even the wives and children of victims of extortion by militant
groups - to be deported and barred from asylum based on
overly broad definitions 7 6of "terrorism" and of what constitutes
"supporting" terrorism.1

This new law constitutes a significant blow to U.S. asylum
law and to the rights of refugees. Its impact will be compounded
by the serious problems that already plague the U.S. asylum adjudication system - the variations in immigration judge grant
rates, 177 the dramatic drop in asylum grant rates 17 8 and appellate
grant rates,1 79 and the deeply troubling lack of legal representation. 181 With the REAL ID Act in place, the United States may
very well find itself returning refugees to their countries of persecution, despite its obligations to the contrary under the 1951
Refugee Convention and its Protocol.1 8 1

amended at Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 208(b) (1) (B) (iii), 8 U.S.C.
1158 (2005))
175. See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 101(a) (3) (B) (i). This language
explicitly allows for the possibility that several reasons can give rise to persecution;
moreover, nothing in the relevant conference report repudiates the BIA's recognition
of persecution based on so-called "mixed motives" in Matterof S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486
(B.I.A. 1996). In addition, the reference to the reason rather that the motive of the
persecution suggests an objective focus on the causes of the persecution rather that on
the subjective motivation of the persecutor. See Lory Diana Rosenberg, Asylum and Protection From Removal After "Real ID" - Newly Articulated Standards and a Reservoir of Law,
10-13 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1 (July 1, 2005); see also Navigating the REAL ID Act, supra
note 171, at 16.
176. See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 103(ix); see also Navigatingthe REAL
ID Act, supra note 171, at 19.
177. See USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 2, supra note 79, at 424-41.

178. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Executive Office of Immigration Review, 2003 Statistical Yearbook 53, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy03syb.pdf.
179. See USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 2, supra note 79, at 239.
180. See USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 1, supra note 70 at 4; see also USCIRF STUDY, VOL. 2,

supra note 79, at 260; Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathon Jacobs, The State of Asylum
Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739 (2002). See generally Donald
Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. INSIGHT, Apr.
2004, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/InsightKerwin.pdf.
181. See Refugee Convention, supra note 11, art. 1; see also 1967 Protocol, supra
note 11.
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CONCLUSION
The United States is essentially at a critical crossroads. The
U.S. government, U.S. policymakers and U.S. citizens have some
decisions to make - decisions that will determine whether or
not this country will continue to be a leader in the protection of
refugees - or not. Will U.S. leaders step forward and do all that
is necessary to ensure that this country lives up to its long tradition of protecting those who flee from persecution? Will the
Homeland Security Secretary create the kinds of structural safeguards that are necessary to make sure that asylum-seekers are
treated properly by the various arms of the Department? Will
the US Congress finally stand up to those who co-opt the language of fear and instead commit to correcting the misguided
laws that deprive genuine refugees of a fair and meaningful
chance to receive this country's protection?
The monumental task that Arthur Helton identified - ensuring that the rights of refugees are not violated in the postSeptember 11th United States - has not been met. In fact, the
rights of many refugees have been ignored, and sometimes trampled upon, in the new security climate. Many have been jailed
under procedures that are arbitrary under international law;
others have been denied asylum even though they are in fact
refugees entitled to protection under international law. Under
the REAL ID Act, still others will be at risk of deportation into
the hands of their persecutors if they cannot satisfy the law's unrealistic and unfair requirements. By returning refugees to their
countries of persecution, the United States will be in violation of
its core legal commitments under the Refugee Convention and
Protocol.
There is still hope though. A diverse coalition of groups are
working together to preserve asylum. These groups, which include faith-based and religious groups as well as human rights,
refugee assistance, and civil rights organizations, span the political spectrum.1 8 2 At the same time, some Congressional leaders
from both parties have opposed extreme legislative proposals
that undermine this country's commitment to refugees.
182. See Savage, supra note 164; see also HEBREW
FORESAKEN:

IMMIGRANT AID Soc., FAITHFUL BUT
REAL ID ACT HARMs VICTIMS OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION (Apr. 11, 2005),

available at http://www.hias.org/News/Docs/FaithfulButForsaken_4-12-05.pdf,
zanne Gamboa, Faith-Based Groups Oppose Immigration Bill, AP, Jan. 30, 2005.
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But stronger leadership is needed. The Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress should categorically reject attempts
to brand asylum-seekers as terrorists and to undermine the institution of asylum. Most critically, refugees themselves must be
given a greater voice in this country. Ironically, the REAL ID
Act, which contained so many anti-refugee provisions, also contained a provision that lifts the cap limiting the number of
asylees who can obtain their green cards each year. This change
will mean that asylees will no longer have to wait ten or fifteen
years to become permanent U.S. residents, a delay that has prolonged their path to citizenship and, as a result, reduced their
voices in public debates.
Affording refugees themselves a greater voice in these debates will also help to promote a better understanding of who
refugees are - and who they are not. As Helton once observed,
in reflecting on refugees:
To States, they can be security risks. To ordinary people, they
can be objects of pity and charity. But refugees matter most
fundamentally because at some level we all realize that but for
the accidents of birth and circumstance, we could be refugees
ourselves. 183
This fundamental human understanding has somehow
been lost in the broader discussions on asylum policy in the
United States. Instead, both the humanitarian impulse to help
and the legal obligation to do so have been undercut - not so
much because of the imperatives of security, but primarily because of the misuse and opportunistic abuse of the language of
"security."
The next few years will, however, be decisive. The U.S. Congress and the Bush Administration will need to make some critical choices. Only if they choose to uphold this country's commitment to those who flee from persecution and to abide by its
legal obligations to refugees, will the United States reverse its
current course and achieve the task that Arthur Helton identified: ensuring that the rights of refugees are not violated in this
new age of security.

183. Hehon, supra note 1.

